The UUP presents its link with the Conservative Party as a way of being at the centre of UK politics.  At the same time that link is likely to push the UUP to the margins of Europe.

The UUP alignment with the Conservatives is presented as part of a wider vision for ‘The Union’, and for the UUP to be at the centre of national discourse.  As we edge towards the European Election, should Jim Nicholson win one of the three Northern Ireland seats he will return to Europe as part of a Conservative led group at the margins of European discourse.

Currently the British Conservatives in the European Parliament are closely associated with the European Peoples Party (EPP) and European Democrats (ED), collectively the EPP-ED.  That is to change following the upcoming European Election in June, with David Cameron committed to leaving the EPP-ED.

The EPP is broadly Christian Democrat in nature and very pro-European Union/Unity.  It is also very much dominated by the Germanic view of ‘social market economy’.  It broadly expects others to share that view.  They are more comfortable with ‘social market’ than ‘free market’, more statist than liberal.  The ED is broadly balanced to believe more in the free market than the social market and more liberal than statist.  The groups probably share more in underlying principle than either would credit the other.

Within the EPP, for example, among the Spanish Popular Party and the Swedish Moderates, there are friends to be found for British Conservatives. But the Conservatives are committed to abandoning these natural friends.

Membership of a group brings the strength in numbers that is necessary to wheel and deal for committee places and influence within the Parliament, as much in Europe as in Westminster. Dan Hannan MEP outlines his support of the Conservative decision to break from the EPP. From Dan Hannan’s position, leaving the EPP makes sense. What is not explained is why this can’t be done within the EPP-ED, building coalitions of like-minded liberal-conservatives from the ED base and using the EPP-ED strength to shift policy.

David Cameron has made a considerable effort to present the Conservative Party as a modern, progressive centre-right party committed to restoring economic prosperity, combined with a strong sense of social justice. The ED is expressly committed to democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law, national sovereignty, free enterprise, minimal regulation, low taxation, private ownership, respect and security for every individual and a strong transatlantic alliance. What in that commitment is out of step with the Conservative Party manifesto for Europe, or indeed for the UK?

The ED cannot make a difference within the EPP-ED because it has not the seven parties to work from a position of strength: it currently has five parties; the two from UK, the Czech ODS, the Portuguese Popular Party and Italian Pensioners Party.  The Conservative party has committed to finding new allies. Possibly. From eastern Europe? There are plenty; many unstable, few unaligned. There is certainly room to work. Eastern Europeans to the centre right feel abandoned by the larger nations – and voted for a Europe of free nations, not a nation-numbing collective. A strong (small, broad c) conservative vision would perhaps help shape politics on a wider arena, a conservatism beyond Britain – a vision for a European big house, perhaps, built on principle and not Party interests. Not while the British Conservatives allow British domestic politics dictate European engagement: actually, British Conservative house-keeping dictating European engagement.

What is not clear is why the Conservatives have decided to cut themselves off from the major and strong centre-right grouping rather than work from within, and what they have to offer that would be particularly attractive or particularly different from what would be possible building from that ED base.

The Conservative Party is heading off into a political corner with its teddy bear.  The Party has reached this point after years of neglect in international relations. While taking part in structures such as the old European Democrat Union (EDU) and International Democrat Union (IDU) the Conservative engagement was at best perfuctory – by default rather than design. True, engagement at IDU level with our American friends was undertaken with greater enthusiasm, though little more purpose. But at Euro level there was always exasperation and confusion as to what it was all about.

International relations in the Conservative Party was most often left to enthusiastic individuals, who threw their heart and soul into carving a relevant and significant place for the Party internationally. But more often than not they were left alone, and without a respected Party role.

The Germans with their powerful Stifung (foundations) and the Swedes with a fundamental commitment to international relations bring purpose to all their European activities and engage in a structured and measured way at all levels from youth through to senior Party activity. Against this, Conservative functionality in engagement meant it often looked out of place or out of step with European colleagues because it was defracted and half-hearted.  Current policy will appear to Europeans as churlish and pointless.

Whether or not the Conservative Party is associated with the EPP would not have been relevant to Northern Ireland’s European vote without the recent Conservative/UUP link-up.  Jim Nicholson made a point in his News Letter web chat that he had “been elected by other MEP colleagues during the last five years to sit on the bureau of the Parliament.” This is in no small part a consequence of his long standing association with the EPP.  What happens when he exits from that group?

Through the Conservative link, the representation in Europe will be significantly weakened as the Conservatives group, UUP in tow, go off to do its own thing. That matters. With Nicholson elected it will mean that none of the MEPS will be part of a significant group – though the EPP could be practical enough to make offers to either Diane Dodds or Jim Allister to retain a British component in its group.   But as it seems likely, all Northern Ireland MEPs would be linked to marginal groups, or be independent.  The strength of connections to major political groups, and the centres of influence that these represent, will be lost completely.

No matter how much the Conservatives and the Ulster Unionists promote their link as strengthening the Union, in Europe it will inevitably result in a reduction in Unionist influence. While many Conservatives believe that Europe doesn’t matter, that attitude is something Northern Ireland can ill afford.

The sole Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) Westminster MP Lady Sylvia Hermon finally, publicly, confirmed the widely held belief that she is unhappy with the Ulster Conservative and Unionist New Force (UCUNF). Following a BBC interview, the Belfast Telegraph has followed through with a series of points on which her disquiet may be founded:

• She feels she was excluded from all discussions about the possibility of a link-up between the parties, despite being their only Westminster politician.

• She was left to discover the dramatic changes in a shop where she spotted the newspaper headlines.

• She has been hauled in (thedissenter emphasis) for meetings with Tory heavy-hitters including Ken Clarke, as well as for talks with David Cameron, flanked (thedissenter emphasis) by the party’s Northern Ireland spokesman Owen Paterson, and Andrew MacKay, a former shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

To these is added her general feeling that the Conservatives have little understanding of Ulster politics. Having listened to a number of presentations by Conservatives in Northern Ireland over the past months that is something that has some resonance with thedissenter.

Print journalists use language to emphasise points or to communicate emotion. thedissenter emphasis in the final point above, suggests that meetings with Sylvia to address ‘issues’ were less of a round table and more of a telling off – serious men telling off a silly woman who should only be impressed at meeting Ken Clarke, David Cameron, Own Patterson and (er) Andrew McKay; men of such importance, she must surely have been impressed.

But why does Sylvia speak now? Perhaps it was the simple opportunity; a radio interview on expenses developed onto other topics, as they do. However, a simple answer that suggested she had had a lot on her mind recently and was still taking time to consider the issue would have stopped the new line of questioning in its tracks.

The opaque nature of all the UCUNF deliberations makes it impossible to know exactly what has happened, or is going on, in the background. For certain, Sylvia has always been an Ulster Unionist. It is a heartfelt statement when she says “If my party chooses to move to call themselves by a different name, I’m terribly sorry and terribly disappointed by that but I remain an Ulster Unionist.” Surely in discussions the emotion of her position would have been recognised – though the apparent tenor of the meetings suggests not; the Conservatives talked, but maybe they didn’t listen.

Perhaps though it was Sylvia’s legal eye that made her snap into being perpared to make her position known. It has been suggested that Sylvia may have been upset at the sight of the very Conservative (in line with UK-wide format) Jim Nicholson Conservative and Unionist election posters that expunge the Ulster Unionist connection. How much more would she be upset at the first of the Jim Nicholson election material. In the small print, to the bottom right of the SURVEY on the leaflet, is a Data Protection declaration. Here it is clear that the information being provided is for the benefit of the Conservative Party and the Conservative Party alone: because as there are still two parties as Sir Reg keeps repeating, the information cannot be passed onto a third party (UUP).

Hardly an example of an equal, sharing, partnership.

In all aspects of the UCUNF collaboration Sylvia may simply be concerned at the imbalance of the relationship between the two parties. As her emotions are in the frame, perhaps it is instinct that is telling her this deal is fundamentally wrong. Sure, the Conservative money to fund this election is very welcome to a cash strapped UUP; a lifeline. Sylvia may well be right in questioning a Conservative lifeline that is ever so loosely tied around the neck of the UUP, for now.

Nominations open and posters appearing, an election is looming, so its time to take a view on the next few weeks of political cut and thrust, or not. There is not much excitement around a European election.

So looking forward (and that is said with all the enthusiasm mustered, which is not that great) the outcome of the vote for the Northern Ireland Members of the European Parliament, June 2009, is unlikely to deliver an electoral surprise. It is probable that the same three Parties will win the seats. That doesn’t mean that the voting spread won’t be of political interest; the biggest story may well be the decline in number of people being bothered to vote.

 

There are three seats up for grabs under the proportional representation system used for the Northern Ireland. These are currently held by Jim Allister, elected under the DUP banner and topping the poll in 2004, Barbre de Brun, Sinn Fein, 2nd highest vote, and Jim Nicholson, UUP, 3rd and elected on final transfers.

A Province-wide campaign is a challenge to all but the larger Parties. This means that, unusually for Northern Ireland, there are relatively few candidates: just seven in the 2004 European election. The Alliance Party, Labour and the Conservative Party threw their lot behind independent John Gilliland.

In 2004, the first count results were as follows:

Jim Allister (DUP) 175,761 (32.0%) up 3.6%; elected on first count.
Bairbre De Brun (SF) 144,541 (26.3%) up 9.0%; elected on first count.
Jim Nicholson (UUP) 91,164 (16.6%) down 1.0%.
Martin Morgan (SDLP) 87,559 (15.9%) down12.1%.
John Gilliland (Independent) 36,270 (6.6%).
Eamonn McCann (SEA) 9,172 (1.6%).
Lindsay Whitcroft (Green) 4,810 (0.9%).

In percentage terms the 2004 parties’ vote was almost the same in the 2007 Assembly elections. However, like for like, the 2004 European Elections saw a decline in the overall vote of around 20% from the 1999 Euro poll. While the DUP topped the poll in both instances, its vote was down around 20,000 in 2004 compared to 1999. The decline in the total unionist vote was about 75,000. Although the Sinn Fein vote was up around 27,000 the big loser was the SDLP whose vote crashed by more than half from the 190,000 votes for John Hume. The great uncertainty in the upcoming election is the extent to which the overall vote might decline and how the spread of that decline will impact on each Party – it is a factor that both unionist and nationalist parties will fear, equally.

There’s no agreed independent candidate this time. The Alliance Party has selected Ian Parsley, a young candidate who is being offered some profile, no doubt with a longer term view of election in the North Down area. In 1999 the Alliance vote was less than 15,000; the same or more would be a huge success for Alliance.

The SDLP selection of Alban Maginness seems to be a pitch for the old traditional middle class vote. Maginness is better known than Martin Morgan, the considerably younger 2004 candidate. There is nothing new to ‘bring back’ voters. The greatest threat to the SDLP is a further decline in their vote: if the SDLP can hold its vote from 2005 it would be happy.

Jim Nicholson is once again standing for the Ulster Unionist Party. The Conservative Party, with which the Ulster Unionists are now aligned, is unlikely to bring many votes. Any small increase in the UUP vote is more likely to be from some middle class Catholic voters who are unhappy with nationalist parties’ support for the end of academic selection.

No doubt Nicholson’s seat will only be secured with the transfer of votes from Jim Allister, now standing for Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV). The UUP will hope that the number of transfers might make the final vote ‘close’ and attempt to use this to vindicate its Conservative alliance. That would be wrong. Transfers to the UUP will be a protest against the DUP, not an indication of trust restored.

Of the two largest parties last time, Sinn Fein keeps Barbre de Brun as its candidate, no doubt campaigning on experience and its ‘leadership’ credentials; though some republicans may be asking where that leadership is heading. de Brun has been virtually anonymous since her election to Europe. The Sinn Fein led policy to end academic selection is as unpopular with parents of children at Catholic Grammars as much as it is unpopular among unionists. On balance though, this is more likely to hit the SDLP, who share Sinn Fein’s policy objective, and is more rooted in the middle classes than Sinn Fein. However, whether any bread and butter issue will make an impact on the European campaigns is doubtful. More fundamentally, Sinn Fein must be looking at both the last Fermanagh Council by-election and the possibility of a ‘dissident’ republican standing and wondering how well the once envied machine will be able to deliver the vote as it has done in the past.

Jim Allister’s TUV poses a threat to the overall DUP vote. There is general Unionist disaffection with the performance of (at) Stormont. It could be expected that up to about one third of the DUP vote at the 2007 Assembly election would have been with an expectation that the Party would not be entering a power-sharing government with Sinn Fein. Some of this group may well still vote for DUP as the least bad option, there will be some not vote at all and the remainder will vote for Jim Allister.

In 1999 Bob McCartney of the UK Unionist Party gained around 20,000 votes, and this vote would certainly have transferred largely to Jim Allister in 2004 – one reason for the DUP vote holding. The DUP will also have benefited in 2004 from a drift of voters away from the Ulster Unionist Party, who by that stage were disillusioned with David Trimble. It is unlikely that any more votes for Jim Allister will come from the UUP – that vote has long left the Ulster Unionist Party.

Jim Allister is likely to pick up the ‘angry’ vote of those who transferred their vote to the DUP, and feel let down, and the DUP vote that believes there is no right time to share power with IRA/Sinn Fein, and feel betrayed. The bookies may be right that Allister’s total vote will most likely amount to no more than around 30,000-40,000 votes. A higher vote and the current sense of a Unionist electorate that is deeply unsettled is actually an electorate with a seething anger towards current political leadership and direction from both Unionist parties.

What then of the DUP? The candidate is Belfast based, though Diane Dodds has a high profile as Councillor and ex-MLA in West Belfast; she is also married to the current Minister of Finance Nigel Dodds, so has high name recognition. Her views on the price of bullocks and lambs is unknown – while Allister has been very much present in the News Letter’s Saturday pullout Farming Life; a widely read farming paper across the community. There is also the possibility that Diane Dodds may suffer to some extent from the fallout from the Westminster expenses row. Some unionist voters may be unwilling to vote for yet another DUP ‘family’. A DUP election strategy based on it being the only Party that can gain more votes than Sinn Fein seems tired, and a little odd when the two parties are ‘sharing’ power in Stormont. Alternative strategies may not be available.

Jim Allister may not have much chance of retaining his European seat, but his votes will still matter and will probably be the focus of post-election media analysis. Allister’s vote represents an angry and alienated Unionist electorate that may be sidelined, but can’t be easily ignored. What will be interesting will be to review the spread of the TUV votes – will Allister’s votes be predominately urban or rural? What would be the impact at the next Westminster election of the TUV vote; where the DUP and UUP are close enough that a decent percent vote by the TUV would mean the UUP regaining a seat, possibly South Antrim – assuming the UUP is able to assure a turnout of its core vote.

There is also interest in the spread of nationalist voting. At this point we do not know if a ‘dissident’ republican will stand in opposition to Sinn Fein. As Liam Clarke says in the Sunday Times, even a 2% ‘dissident’ vote would impact on the Sinn Fein’s ambitions. Will Sinn Fein fail to gain votes, or even hold its own? Will the SDLP hold enough votes to still be in the political game come the Westminster election within the next year or so.

There is little to suggest that the outcome of the June election will be anything other than the same old parties being returned to Europe. But the disaffection with the current political leaderships may mean that a protest may be made by opting for the outsider or simply not voting. Will we be looking at another sectarian head-count in the June Euro poll? Perhaps. Perhaps also wondering where the heads have gone?

Henry McDonald makes a valuable contribution to historical perspective on the role of Sinn Fein over the past half century. The theme of his book is ‘how Sinn Fein dressed up defeat as victory’. But it does more. The reader may be of a mind to believe that actions speak louder than words, or conversely that the pen is mightier than the sword. Either way, the bringing together of the words and deeds of the IRA/Sinn Fein over a period of over half a century is a sobering read.

The book thoroughly lays bare the futility of the IRA’s campaign, and the lies used to propagate that campaign and on which the pursuit of its political objectives has been prosecuted.

MacDonald outlines the lies. These could be direct as in the attempt to shift the blame for the Abercorn bombing onto the British Army or a unionist grouping. Or they could be more subtle as in the effort to justify the murder of Edgar Graham as somehow inevitable through his being part of a ‘Unionist establishment’ at Queen’s University Belfast where he lectured – as if that could ever justify murder.

He outlines the disingenuous. How, if collusion between loyalist paramilitaries and British forces was endemic, as republicans strongly contend, were only 3% of those killed by loyalists over 30 years militant republicans? The IRA promoted itself as the ‘defender’ of the local catholic population in many areas: yet the single largest loss of life in the predominately nationalist Short Stand was caused by an IRA bomb exploding prematurely.

Mostly he outlines how anything now claimed to have been achieved by the IRA could well have been achieved equally through non-violence. This book is not an easy read. First, and the only criticism, it would have benefited from a stronger editorial hand in organising the information. Second, and perhaps the order of the information makes no difference, the book is depressing.

The book is depressing because it suggests that the IRA is the same as it ever was: the lies over Abercorn, the cover-up over Robert McCartney, the wall of silence over Paul Quinn.

Even more depressing is the code of republicanism in its attitude to Protestants/Unionists. With the exception of one or two who McDonald rightly praises for their individual effort, that effort seems overwhelmed by the words and deeds of others. For the most part Protestants/Unionists simply don’t matter.

McDonald’s book is an inconvenient truth for Republicans. It is a valuable handbook for anyone who wants an insight into the Republican mindset. It is a welcome contribution to understanding the present and learning from the past. To conclude on a positive note. If we learn from the past, and better understand our present, there is that little bit of extra hope for the future.

The Conservative Party and Ulster Unionist Party are to work together.

The two parties, and they are still two parties, have reached an accommodation. Vice-Chairman of the Northern Ireland Conservatives, Jeff Peel, provided some insight to Conservative thinking behind the arrangement on the regional Politics Show. The desire to create a new political space, offering the electorate something that is not based on the nationalist/unionist them/us equation, is to be applauded.

Alex Kane writes in the News Letter about the ‘pact’ from an Ulster Unionist viewpoint. It is interesting that the word ‘agreement’ never appears. Yes, the two parties have ‘agreed closer cooperation’ (conditional agreement). But the words used to describe the status of the new arrangement are many and varied: pact; links; relationship, albeit ‘mutually beneficial’; project, electoral vehicle; or electoral force.

The arrangement reached between the Conservatives and the Ulster Unionists does appear to be constructively ambiguous. While both Parties are able to talk about going forward together, they remain distinctly independent. Each, however, must anticipate some gains in this arrangement to be prepared to at least look as if they are in some way co-joined.

For the Ulster Unionist Party the benefit may be more immediate. The proof of a policy is in its appeal to the electorate and the first election to test the Conservative/UUP arrangement will be Europe in 2009. It must be expected that the Conservatives will provide both finance and electoral expertise – both in short supply around the UUP – to support the candidacy of Jim Nicholson, the current UUP MEP. It will be important that Jim Nicholson is able to record at least an improved vote on the last election, even if he remains the unionist electorate’s second choice. For Nicholson to be third behind the other sitting unionist (ex-DUP) MEP, Jim Alistair, would be catastrophic for the UUP and represent a setback for the new arrangement.

It must also please the UUP that the arrangement seems to have upset the DUP: though why it matters to the larger party (by electoral vote) is unclear. So what if a youngish, intelligent, financially strong Conservative Party in Northern Ireland has saddled itself with an aging, cliquish and financially embarrassed UUP? Where is the threat to the DUP?

From the detail that is available on the new Conservative/UUP arrangement there is nothing to suggest that it will make a great deal of difference to the electoral map. It is fair to say that for Europe, that all-important first test, Jim Nicholson is going to be old wine in a new bottle; hardly a challenge for the DUP. The DUP remains the largest Party at Westminster, and none of their seats appears to be vulnerable to another unionist Party. The present political state of Britain suggests that the election may be closer than it would have been six months ago and the nine DUP seats may ultimately matter more to the Conservative Party than the one UUP seat in North Down.

A temporary halt to UUP electoral decline, with a fair wind and some new blood presented to the electorate, should be expected from the Conservative/UUP arrangement That, however, would be enough for the Conservatives nationally. The declaration of intent to stand a candidate in every constituency in the country is not just political hubris. Should David Cameron’s Conservatives win the next election, as they are expected to do, it will be a very English victory. Understanding the weakness of a national government with only a handful of representatives outside of England in devolved jurisdictions, the fallback will be that the Conservatives stood in every seat.

While not winning a great many seats in the first past the post contests, a mandate of sorts might be presumed from an increased vote, or at least a substantial vote in all parts of the United Kingdom. If Labour lose votes, even if the Conservative Party gain few, it could be expected that the Conservatives could achieve 15%-18% in of he vote in Scotland, 20%-25% in Wales and with the UU arrangement between 15%-20% in Northern Ireland. Respectable.

As David Shiels points out in the Belfast Telegraph the position plays well with the grassroots of the Conservative Party. The play will also provide a positive to balance with elements of the broader and very necessary Cameronian modernisation that may not have played so well with the grassroots. This is not to say that David Cameron is not genuine in wishing to embed ‘unionism’ as a fundamental value within the Conservative Party. The time spent by Cameron and his colleagues in supporting the process to arrive at the current arrangement with the UUP does not suggest that this is a mere sideshow in some bigger political game plan.

Doubts about the arrangement only arise because it hardly seems final. It is an arrangement that lacks a sense of fundamental shift. Where is the seismic shake to the body politic? The announcement hardly generated a sense of excitement that would radically alter the political landscape.

Shifts in electoral allegiances in Northern Ireland tend to happen as a consequence of something significant happening in the wider political arena. The Maze IRA hunger strikes gave Sinn Fein its entry to the political scene. The Belfast Agreement resulted in the Ulster Unionist vote being eroded over time by the DUP. Nothing has happened to make the Conservative/UU arrangement seem particularly relevant to where Northern Ireland politics stands today, or anytime soon.

David Cameron will come to Belfast for Ulster Unionist Conference on the 6th December. It is the same weekend that commemorates the Shutting of the Gates in Londonderry. Will Cameron be able to inspire the electorate with a vision of a new constructive Unionism that will result in electoral success for the new arrangement. Or will the electorate decide that for now ‘safety’ lies behind the familiar and safe walls, biding their time to see which way the wind blows.

The Saville Inquiry into Bloody Sunday is: “established for inquiring into a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely the events on Sunday 30 January 1972 which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in Londonderry on that day, taking account of any new information relevant to events on that day.”

For the families of those who died on Bloody Sunday their stated objective in the long campaign for a Public Inquiry is ‘the truth’. Their hope is admirable. Is their cause attainable? Will they gain closure?

We will ballpark the sum to be spent on the Saville Inquiry at around £200 million, give or take a few million. It has taken years, volumes of evidence, acres of newspaper reporting. One more year is needed, apparently, before a report will be ready. And then? Will the truth be told?

At the end of the Saville Inquiry all we will have is a conclusion based on the volume of information the Inquiry has gathered. To understand just why the Saville Inquiry will fail to find a definitive truth we need to look just a year or two later than Bloody Sunday.

Kathleen Feeney was 14 years old when she was shot while playing on a street in Londonderry, November 1973. She was the second youngest of five children and the sister of an SDLP Councillor.

At the time the IRA said; “The people of Derry are aware that we have admitted responsibility for our actions even when mistakes were made by us and civilians injured.” It continued: “We say categorically that the shooting of young Kathleen Feeney was the work of the British Army and not of the Republican movement.”

Unsurprisingly, street rioting and mayhem ensued after the shooting. The IRA claimed at the time that it had killed a soldier dead in revenge.

Over thirty years later the IRA issued a statement that tells a very different version of events. In a statement released to the Derry Journal the Provisional IRA said: “The IRA accepts responsibility for the death of Kathleen Feeney. Our failure to publicly accept responsibility for her death until now has only added to the hurt and pain of the Feeney family.” The statement continued that: “Kathleen was hit by one of a number of shots fired by an IRA active service unit that had fired upon a British army foot patrol.”

There was an apology to the Feeney family. The statement also made reference to, “an operation against the British Army in retaliation for the death of Kathleen Feeney.” There was no apology for the murder of the unnamed soldier.

We know therefore that the IRA believed it perfectly just to lie to exacerbate division and to increase alienation of nationalists from authority. The killing of Kathleen Feeney was important in this respect. The sister of an SDLP councillor would show that no nationalist was ‘safe’ from the Brits: that the Brits killed indiscriminately. The claim to have shot a British soldier in reprisal placed the IRA as defenders of all nationalists and not just republicans.

Why does this matter in respect to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry? It matters because lying about IRA operations was an essential element of strategy. Anything that reinforced alienation from the British, and in particular induced a hatred of the British Army, was an essential part of building the IRA’s profile as defenders of the Catholic population.

So is it possible to believe IRA claims not to have had guns on the streets on the day? Did the Parachute Regiment shoot without provocation?

How could the IRA ever admit to having played a role on Bloody Sunday? Bloody Sunday shocked, alienated, and radicalised the Catholic population of Londonderry, and further afield. The IRA gained moral justification for its campaign of violence.

The IRA gave no evidence to the Saville Inquiry. For the IRA there is one truth – a truth that allowed a single day to justify murder and mayhem for a generation to follow, and even now…

Pity the families of those who died as a consequence of Bloody Sunday; the fourteen who died as a consequence of that particular day and the scores that followed in the wake. The search for truth, irrelevant of how much money is spent, will probably remain a futile quest.

The IRA lied to further its cause in respect of Kathleen Feeney’s murder. Should we dismiss the possibility that it could not allow the truth to be revealed if that were to undermine a fundamental justification on which it built its murderous campaign?

Poor little Kathleen Feeney was merely collateral damage to the IRA. Her family could be afforded the truth because in the history of the total conflict her death was of little significance to the IRA. Will there be any such closure for the families of those who died on Bloody Sunday?

If you go to see prison service brutality and the heroism of Bobby Sands then that is likely what you will see in ‘Hunger’, the film directed by Steve McQueen.

If you go expecting to see Republican propaganda on the big screen, then you’ll see Republican propaganda.

Republicans seemed to welcome the movie as a tribute to the courage of Bobby Sands and Unionists condemned the waste of State money that supported the making of the ‘Republican’ movie in Northern Ireland.

The tackling of a subject matter such as the 1981 Hunger Strike makes the movie ‘controversial’? Thought provoking perhaps, but no movie is controversial simply because of its subject. Is ‘Hunger’ a true portrayal – of course not, it is a movie. Is the treatment of the subject matter ‘fair’ – by whose judgement or against what criteria? Does it make Sands the Hero – Steve McQueen, the director, says ‘take a closer look if that is what you think.’

There has been a great deal of focus on the dialogue between Sands (played outstandingly by Michael Fassbender) and the fictional Fr Dominic Moran (Liam Cunningham). This is the most intense piece of dialogue in a movie that largely speaks through its cinematography. The movie is a triptych. To understand the importance of this dialogue it is necessary to explore before and after this centrepiece.

The first part of the film is about the Prison Officer Raymond Lohan (Stuart Graham). This is a portrait of a man on the edge. His only fleeting escape is locker room bravado with his fellow officers. Lohan is a lonely man. He dresses alone, eats alone, stands alone. His loneliness is compounded by visits to an aged mother who does not know his name. He is a man who no longer knows himself. Lost.

Then there is the new inmate, Davey Gillen (Brian Milligan) uncomfortable with his demand for political status, longing for family, out of place among his fellow inmates on the IRA dirty protest. Yet a member of the IRA and therefore obliged to conform, to believe. Trapped.

The focus of the film moves slowly towards Sands as the central subject. The encounter with Fr Moran is gripping. It is Moran who frames final act. He questions Sands’s motive in pursuing a hunger strike to the death. He points to the IRA inmates as being out of touch. Inside too long. Brutalised by the system, and yet of the system. How in such circumstances could any decision be rational? Deluded.

Sands responds as a driven and focused individual. It is his vision, his will, his decision. Moran points to the inmates as a mill stone around the neck of the IRA, the dirty protest as being a no win strategy that took the initiative away from a leadership outside the prison. Sands was taking them into a new no-win battle that would simply draw attention to IRA impotence. Sands does not accept this. Sands believes he is the future. His death will be a new dawn, an inspiration to the next generation. Martyr.

The last part of the movie guides us through the death of Sands. The brutality of the opening part of the movie is contrasted with the serene, humanity of death.

All that is left is the question posed by Fr Moran to Sands: ‘what does death achieve?’

This movie does not present Sands as a hero. He is presented as a man with purpose, but out of date and out of touch. His death was his choice, his decision: as was the death of Lohan. It was right that the film ended on the death of Sands. It was an end in more ways than one.

For the first time since reading Richard O’Rawe’s book ‘Blanketmen’, the end of ‘Hunger’ allowed me to understand why Sinn Fein/IRA/Republicans dislike O’Rawe so much. O’Rawe’s proposition is that the inmates wished to end the hunger strike after four men had died, but the outside command allowed the strike to continue to enable Owen Carron to keep the Parliamentary seat won by Bobby Sands.

Fr Moran points to the deep hole in which the ‘outside’ command found itself at the time of the hunger strikes. There was no military victory possible and the course of political discourse was being driven by factors inside the Maze prison and beyond ‘control’. Ironically the Sands hunger strike provided the IRA with a way out of that hole. The election of Sands and then Carron set them on a political path that has ultimately led them to Stormont.

Sands represents the end of an era. That is why O’Rawe has been cast out of the Republican family. He pointed out that the hunger strike became a vehicle for change; a change that ended the IRA of Bobby Sands and heralded a new political era – not quite the new dawn that Sands had anticipated. Betrayed.

Hunger is a powerful movie. There are powerful performances by the cast. There are powerful undercurrents too.

The prison is turned into a metaphor for a society that is brutalised. People, ordinary people are caught in a self-perpetuating cycle of violence being fed by alienation and disassociation from all else outside this maelstrom.

In Sands there is a man who seeks to inspire a new generation – the revolutionary vanguard to a new United Ireland. Instead, his death served a cause far removed from the one for which he was prepared to die. The Armalite placed on the shelf in exchange for the off the shelf Armani.

Sands. Lost, trapped, deluded, martyr, betrayed.

Both Barack Obama and John McCain stand for change. Yet despite months of electioneering the nature of that change, whoever becomes President, remains unclear.

With George Bush’s approval ratings, the surprise of the current Presidential election is that Barack Obama is not leading by a far greater margin. The Republican Party is fighting the prospect of losing the Presidential election and perhaps also in both Houses of Congress.

It is a testimony to the strength of character of John McCain and the level of trust and admiration for the man that he has stayed in the race. Polls have been wrong before, and the margins at the weekend before the Presidential election are close enough for McCain to be positive.

That said, it is more than likely that Obama will win on Tuesday. On that day, and with hindsight, the Democrats will congratulate themselves on making the right choice. That will remain to be proven by Obama in Office. Certainly, he won the Democratic nomination by appealing to the Democrat grassroots, more liberal (left) than the overall Democrat registered voter who largely backed Hilary Clinton. In the course of the Presidential campaign he has been more centrist, as far as we can tell.

Will Obama be the pragmatic President or go with the liberal flow, particularly if both Houses of Congress are controlled by Democrats? We don’t know. Despite the huge election spend and thousands of miles travelled on the campaign trail, Obama has stuck to a simple constant message that gives little about the future conduct of President Obama.

Obama has been criticised for keeping the press at bay and controlling a very disciplined campaign. That would be wrong. His team understands that political victory does not happen because you are right, but because you have a message that connects with people and (even more importantly) because you are better organised than your opponent.

If both candidates have offered change, what makes the more inexperienced and relatively unknown quality of Barack Obama more popular? Both represent how Americans would like to believe themselves to be. John McCain represents the brave, redoubtable spirit of ‘never say die’. He is an independent spirit, someone who does what is right rather than what is popular and someone prepared to stand up to vested interests, even those of his own Party.

And yet. John McCain’s heroism is of another war. As the Iraqi ‘surge’ pushes the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan out of the headlines, and the battle for economic recovery is more pressing, John McCain’s strengths seem not to be for this era.

Instead it is Barack Obama who represents the moment. America is a ‘can do’ society. There is a belief that anyone can achieve success, no matter their background and no matter their start in life. It matters to America what others think of them: that it appears President Bush has made America unpopular abroad. It matters, equally, that Barack Obama is highly regarded overseas, which was seen to be demonstrated in Berlin – check out the Economist world poll, which reflects that goodwill. Obama aspires, inspires and, because of war and the economy, he is the man who at this moment most completely represents the American Dream. At this point in time, he represents what America wants to believe about itself and what it can achieve.

John McCain might very possibly be a great American President. It is not his time. The Republican Party needs to look at what McCain has achieved in this election, to the electorate he has reached outside the core Republican vote, and to the messages on which he has built his support. John McCain will not have lost the Presidential election, Barack Obama will have resolutely won.

If the Republican Party does not understand the desire of Americans for a change in their political process then it will be the biggest loser on Tuesday 4 November. While Sarah Palin might reassure the core Republican vote, that vote would not in itself elect John McCain, nor will it save Republicans from losing Congressional seats. A mean spirited Republican Party out to punish Democrats for their victory will only end up proving its own unelectability. The Republican Party needs to understand this for its own sake and to ensure that it holds Barack Obama to his message of reaching out across America to build the future, especially as it remains unclear what sort of future that will be.

Even if Democrats take Congress, House of Representatives and Senate, Obama will have been more than a significant part of that success. He be in a position to lead Congress, not follow. He will, in his own right, hold the mandate to fulfil the hopes and dreams of the American people. He will be able to shape America to his own ideal, whatever that is. Along with the American electorate we must all hope that an Obama Presidency will bring ‘change we can believe in’.

The intervention by police to stop a circus owner exercising elephants through the streets of the seaside town of Bangor may well be put down to the absurdity of life in Northern Ireland. Where else?

A closer look at this incident makes the controversy over the ‘homecoming’ parade for soldiers through the streets of Belfast on Sunday 2 November, and the Sinn Fein protest march/meeting more understandable. How?

The police were alerted to the elephant’s walking in Bangor by an anti-circus campaigner. This individual gleefully told radio listeners that he took this action to highlight opposition to the use of animals in circuses. Had he chosen to make a ‘ban circuses’ placard and walked with the elephants he may have looked a little silly and a lone voice. Why look silly when you can call the police and use the law?

We can be reasonably sure that the Parades Commission, set up to consider parades in Northern Ireland, was not set up to stop an elephant walking down the road. But it can. Just as it can stop vintage car rallies and cycling clubs on the public road – yes it can!

The difficulty for the authorities in establishing the Parades Commission was that to make exceptions would have also made it obvious that the legislation was aimed primarily at the curtailment of freedom of expression by one section of the community. By far the greatest numbers of Parades are annual commemorations by the Loyal Orders.

Protest events along the Loyal Order parade routes are not unusual. If people want to protest they have that right, within the law. Nor should we be surprised if Sinn Fein have decided to bring republicans onto the streets of Belfast to protest against the ‘homecoming’ parade.

The first difficulty for Sinn Fein is that this parade is for the Royal Irish Regiment, which retains strong local attachment and many have served gallantly. Local press have reported extensively on the RIR contribution, almost exclusively on a ‘human interest’ level.

The second difficulty is the purpose served by the protest. Mostly, Sinn Fein has been at sixes and sevens on this point. Protest, as with parade, must be notified to the Parades Commission. But in the media the protest has been variously stated to be about the War in Iraq, the killing of republicans by the British Army through the years of local conflict, the British presence in Irish, and so on.

Here is the point. The lack of consistency in reasons for the protest is down to a failure to dress up naked anti-British sentiment; blatant coat-trailing. In the final analysis the opposition to the parade is opposition to anything British. Just as the issue was not the elephant down the road, but the reason the elephant was in Bangor, so it is not the ‘homecoming’ parade for the RIR, but the fact that it is the British in Northern Ireland.

So too with Loyal Order Parades. Republican opposition was orchestrated, often with extreme violence, creating the controversy that led to a clamour for the regulation of parades enabling further diminishment of fundamental freedoms – now by the state, willingly and disgracefully undermining the Rule of Law. The elephant in the room is the sheer sectarian hatred of anything and everything British.

For those few from the Protestant community taking part in face to face dialogue the frustration in never being told what the issues were with specific respect to the parade under discussion is one reason why dialogue has been so elusive. There is little evidence from the dialogue that has taken place that there is any willingness to accommodate anything that celebrates, or represents, ‘Britishness’.

The IRA’s use of meetings between communities to collect information on Protestant community leaders, to ‘target’ them in military parlance, is clear evidence of the disingenuous manner in which republicans have worked on the parades issue.

Which then brings us back to the Strategic Review on Parades, currently considering its Interim Consultation Report. The Review group should note the not unsurprisingly bitter political row that has erupted over the ‘homecoming’ parade. That a parade has once again become a political punchbag is to be expected.

Political interference has prolonged the parades issue in Northern Ireland. The Parades Commission was itself a buck-passing exercise by the NIO, supported by the police – a firewall to take the heat off the Secretary of State and Chief Constable. It was born of political strategy and suckled by the political expediency of politicians who wanted to be seen as leading the fight (both sides), and by the demands of the ‘political process’ that meant not confronting the realities of rights and responsibilities as they should be within a society where the Rule of Law is paramount.

The current ‘thinking’ of the Parades Review group is that ‘parading’ should no longer be the responsibility of a Parades Commission, but that parading is placed within the Office of OFMDFM. How this will not result in political interference/dealing/brokering is something beyond imagination.

The Strategic Review seems to be predicated on a political deal on policing and justice taking place. That the Review on Parades depends on a political deal is itself a weakness and indicative of a fundamental flaw in strategic thinking. A principled and fair outcome to the resolution of parades issues should be a local matter and not reliant on externalities. If the Review itself depends on a political deal, then how is there hope that parades will not continue to be politicised and used to modulate tensions and division to the benefit of a few and to the detriment of all.

In a free society, the Rule of Law would regulate parade and protest. The OFMDFM should be capable of respecting the necessary conditions for a free society, without rancour.

The issue of parades in Northern Ireland is unlikely to be resolved while the elephant remains in the room.

The Strategic Review on Parading appears to have lost its way. The Interim Consultative Report published before the summer seems to spend much of its pages outlining a Parades Commission Mark II, in all but name.

Surely a strategic report on Parades would start with the North Report, prelude to the Parades Commission being established, and review the journey since then. What has changed? It might also look at each of the five reviews of the Parades Commission that have gone before. Perhaps it might also spend some time reviewing the relative success of the Parades Commissions as lead by each of its three Chairmen.

In the absence of such review and analysis it is hard to understand how the Review team has arrived at the 8 Step process it is suggesting as a replacement for the Parades Commission. An Interim Consultation Report would surely be one where principle is outlined as a basis of moving forward, with perhaps a range of options based on those principles. Certainly it would address fundamental concerns about the Parades Commission’s present process.

A major issue around the Parades Commission has been confidentiality. The Parades Commission largely rode out the storm over information sourced from the Parades Commission being found in the possession of the IRA during the 2005 Stormontgate investigations – there has never been any explanation of how this may have occurred. At the same time the Commission has justified taking ‘evidence’ from anonymous individuals in camera on the basis of respect for confidentiality.

The Commission’s particular view on ‘confidentiality’ has meant that Parade organisers have repeatedly been presented with a negative determination wrapped up in human rights packaging, but with no idea of the nature or content of objections to the parade. This runs contrary to the principle of natural justice – a fundamental within the European Convention on Human Rights – where is a decision is made to your detriment that you should at least know the reasons on which that decision is based. ‘Confidentiality’ to that extent can never be a justifiable derogation from this fundamental right.

A Judicial Review was initiated in 2001/2002 or on the matter of Natural Justice, and was used by the Parades Commission during a Northern Ireland Affairs Committee Review (House of Commons) to defer questioning on this subject. Denied legal aid, as the case was considered to be on behalf of a group, the applicant for the Judicial Review appealed on the point of whether or not legal aid could be available to an individual member of a group affected by a ruling. If the Strategic Review were doing some homework, the outcome of either of these applications, if for no other reason than legal clarification, would have been noted.

Legal matters are not something the Review Group seems to wish the reader to dwell upon. The Report is written in such a way as to suggest that the 8 Step process is all very informal and matter of fact: and by the way there is a legally binding adjudication, but only at the end of the process.

If there is a final ‘legally binding adjudication’ on a parade, every step along the entire process is one of legal relevance. The confection that the early stages are in actuality ‘informal’ is either naïve or misguided. The 8 Steps suggested raises huge issues with respect to the burden placed on individuals being asked to engage in a process that is fraught with legal pitfalls.

The greatest concern must be the notion being proffered that somehow those who object to speaking to anyone who had been actively engaged in terrorist activity that might have a personal resonance would not have to do so. Really?

In rural areas, though not exclusively, an element of the terrorist campaign was to ensure that victims and families would be made aware of who had carried out attacks and yet walk with impunity within the community. This ‘in your face’ brashness increased a sense of alienation, embedded fear and increased insecurity among many Protestants; especially so in the border Counties. Rebuilding trust will take a great many years. Forcing ‘face to face’ encounters will not aid the healing process.

With a ‘legally binding adjudication’ it would not be enough to ‘believe’ or to ‘know’ that a person was involved in terrorist activity. It would have to be a fact; a proven fact in a court of law. It is also a fact that the clear up rate for Republican murders is no more than around 10%. Dialogue will be enforced no matter how unpalatable; even thought a cursory reading of the Strategic Review’s Report would suggest otherwise.

The Interim Consultative Report fails to make a compelling case for its 8 Steps. The suggested Step process fails to address the fundamental faults of the current Parades Commission. A legal minefield awaits unless the Review group undertakes a serious rethink of its entire approach.