The Northern Ireland electorate heads towards the 5 May with little enthusiasm for the choice being presented, little interest in the institutions, and little understanding of what the Assembly has achieved over its past four years. Read more… »

The short video at the bottom of this post is about as neat, succinct and certain in defining classical liberalism as you will find anywhere.  It builds on Dr Nigel Ashford’s short book Principles of a Free Society, commissioned by the Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation which identifies the core elements to a Civic Society: Democracy; Equality; Free Enterprise; Freedom; Human Rights; Justice; Peace; Private Property; The Rule of Law; and Spontaneous Order. Read more… »

Motivation has been hard to find at the outset of 2011. It’s election year, again. To get started, a view on where matters stand politically in Northern Ireland generally.

The UK Government’s economic measures to tackle the country’s financial deficit will start to impact on all citizens in 2011. It will be a tough year ahead for everyone. The cost of living is rising, with households already noticing  increased costs creeping through to the weekly shopping. Just as households need to keep their spending under control, the need for good and efficient government at all levels is essential. Northern Ireland is not an exception in this regard. Read more… »

Commentators seemed to view the overwhelming victory of Tom Elliott in the Ulster Unionist Party leadership contest as the Party taking a ‘traditional’ and safe option, rather than the more media savvy and ‘liberal’ option of Basil McCrea.  There is something about that analysis that seems too simple to thedissenter.

The result would suggest that ‘liberal’ unionism is now a marginalised group of around 30% of the Party.  If this group is passionate about change and maximised its vote, in fact it is only 15% of the Party; as the 1000 or so attending the election meeting amounts to around half the membership. What this actually represents is a decreasing element in the Ulster Unionist Party, which broadly reflects a wider disillusionment and disaffection with liberal Unionism that has been building for some time, the outcome of which is electoral decline.

Most would agree with the notion that while David Trimble may have been elected as a ‘hardliner’ he ended up a ‘liberal’. Trimble’s successor was not a hardliner. The battle for the leadership in 2005 was hardly one which reflected a strengthening of the ‘hard line’ within the Party: quite the opposite. David Trimble’s right-hand and supporter of UUP acceptance of the Good Friday Agreement won in 2005, defeating Alan McFarland (who would not be described as a champion of ‘traditional’ unionism). David McNarry, who also ran in the three-way race, gained only 8% of the votes, while McFarland gained 43% and Sir Reg Empey won when McNarry’s vote transferred to the least worst alternative of Sir Reg who had gained 48% in the first round of voting.

In that context the vote for Basil McCrea of around 30% was a surprise and represented either a sharp decline in liberal unionism or a woefully bad liberal champion.

Why did Basil lose?

First Basil. Basil McCrea is intelligent and articulate. He has been described as modern and media savvy. It is certainly the case that Basil is a crowd pleaser, not least the media crowd. He has the eye for a media or photo opportunity. He uses what is to hand and uses it well. Yet, there is another side to this. It is exemplified by two points in his campaign.

One: the post from Jeff Peel which pointed to Basil’s previous dalliance with the Northern Ireland Conservatives; in response to which Basil wisely stayed silent. Two: was his campaign launch speech.  His speech was well received, as being current and addressing the ‘now’: any analysis shows it exactly ticked a range of current themes. That is what Basil seems to do best. He is a man for the moment, as with his interest at a point in time with the Conservative Party. This does not lead to consistency, and nor does it indicate deep commitment to policy or principle in pursuit of political advantage.

Second, what of liberal unionism? This is not a fixed or settled idea. Bob McCartney might be considered a ‘hard line’ unionist, but he is undoubtedly a liberal in broad political outlook.  Alex Kane presents the case for being uncompromising as a unionist, but a hardliner?

There are many who describe themselves as ‘liberal unionist’, not least in the blogosphere. There has been questioning over what has happened over the past year with UCUNF and moving forward. However, some of those who comment or blog from this personally considered perspective too often seem to be embarrassed by party political unionism in any form; sometimes suggesting that liberal unionists should in fact be ‘neutral’ on the union (surely a contradiction). These tend to have a quintessential negative view on political Unionism – that it fails to be positive, progressive, fair, inclusive, non-sectarian.  This leaves others to presume that political unionism is therefore negative, reactionary, partisan, narrow and sectarian; though sometimes little is left to presume.

Yet, the present champions of liberal unionism lack a distinctive narrative that does not belittle other Unionists or offer a coherent policy agenda as an alternative.  Liberal unionists may retort, ‘an alternative to what?’; perhaps, but that does not amount to a cast iron liberal case.

Nor have the emergent political champions of liberal unionism acted in such a way that evidences a mature political personality. Basil McCrea wanders around with barely concealed resentment at having lost, Trevor Ringland petulantly struts out of the Party, and Paula Bradshaw snipes from her blog. Coming together around a broad ‘2010 Group’, perhaps being joined by Alan McFarland (?), they might well have a useful forum to consider why it was they lost rather than the UUP.

Besides a lack of narrative, and poor leadership, liberal unionism is not of this political moment. Sullied by the collapse of electorate trust in the UUP under David Trimble’s leadership, compounded by the hapless political ineptitude of Sir Reg Empey, ‘liberal unionism’ has been to the fore of Ulster Unionism for more than a decade and seems to have left, literally, the Party in a state of near terminal decline. To that extent, the election of Tom Elliott is more properly viewed as evidence of the membership’s determination to stop the ‘liberal’ rot.

This reflects widespread unease among the unionist population about the political future. While the Union 2021 series in the News Letter has evidenced remarkable confidence in the Union, that does not alleviate unease at the unrelenting obstruction of Sinn Fein to making Northern Ireland work – not least in respect of education – and a perceived inability of Unionist politicians (not unique to the UUP) to present a framework for moving forward that out-politics Sinn Fein.

Although Basil McCrea lost the leadership contest in the Ulster Unionist Party, the margin by which Tom took the leadership is flattering.  Neither candidate presented much by way of a vision for either the Party or Northern Ireland through the leadership campaign. Both placed undue focus on Party structural issues of little interest to the electorate, or generated rhetorical disputes on hypothetical scenarios. Neither showed an ability to rise above well-worn propositions.

Tom was not Basil. Still, there were factors Tom Elliott’s favour, and it would be wrong to suggest that his vote was largely undeserved. Perhaps not an exceptional speaker, but at least what he says is consistent and thoughtful – even if not always articulate; the GAA/Gay Pride kerfuffle was the result of clumsiness rather than any malicious prejudice.  On balance what may be regarded as personality or presentational weaknesses in Tom Elliott are capable of being corrected in time, whereas Basil is just Basil.

The strength of numbers turning out to vote for Tom from his local constituency Association shows strength in organisation and loyalty, which is mutual.  The Ulster Unionist Party was once a formidable machine. 40 years of conflict took its toll on Unionist Party organisation; as communities disintegrated, the middle classes first fled to surburbia, eschewed political affiliation and preferred to keep their heads down. Even so, when David Trimble became leader of the UUP there was a strong quotient of younger politicos, and a decent constituency worker network. When trust broke down internally and with the wider Ulster Unionist electorate, the Party lost its youth, many of its best election workers, and depth in membership (yes that includes the break with the Orange Order). The Party lost what remained of its innate ability to connect across the wide range of ‘constituencies’ that make up the Unionist electorate. Fermanagh is an exception. The rest of the Party wants some of what Fermanagh has managed to retain, and a leader who knows what that might be.

The Ulster Unionist Party which Tom Elliott inherits is very much smaller than it was a decade ago: though not necessarily smaller than the DUP at organisational or Constituency level. It may not have the workers it once had, but then the TUV Annual Conference is populated with UUP and DUP election workers. However, a smaller party means that local cliques, personal fiefs and sometimes family allegiances have a disproportionate say in candidate selection and a wholly negative impact on recruitment.

Tom Elliott needs to focus on building the organisation but this is hampered by the state in which he finds the Party – aging, clique-ridden and drifting. Thrust into this mix is the selection process, which complicates Tom’s capacity to build party unity as a first step in strengthening the UUP’s core and building membership to extend reach and gain electoral impact. A look around the process, so far, of selecting candidates for next year’s Assembly elections presents the scale of the challenge and the complexity created by the two/three tier selection process: originally planned under Trimble’s leadership to help quell/suppress dissenting candidates.

It is viewed by the liberal wing of the UUP that the lack of female representation is to the detriment of the Party’s electoral fortunes, though it didn’t seem to do the DUP any harm in 2010. Following the failure of the most prominent female candidate in the 2010 Westminster election, Paula Bradshaw, to gain Assembly selection at the first hurdle in South Belfast, the issue of female candidates has once again come to the fore. It should be noted that in pure mathematic and electoral considerations the spread of the three candidates recommended from the initial South Belfast Constituency selection meeting made sense, taking a start point that Michael McGimpsey, the current Minister for Health, was a shoe-in. Paula Bradshaw has since left the Party.

Although David McClarty gained over half the votes of those gathered for the East Londonderry Constituency selection meeting, the second stage constituency/HQ election meeting selected the two candidates are supported by less than half of the constituency in the first instance. But David McClarty cannot now be selected on appeal to the Party Executive without the second most popular candidate being selected.  The problem? That would mean candidates would both be men. On the other hand, there is a risk of alienating or demoralising a substantial proportion of the constituency association.

The Party’s Women’s Development Officer Sandra Overend was selected as one of two being put forward to the second stage of selection in Mid Ulster.  However, her margin of victory was less than the number of family members at the meeting (she is daughter of Billy Armstrong, the sitting MLA). Oddly, the other candidate, a more experienced election campaigner, has since withdrawn from the selection process before the second stage: now no-one will able to suggest that Sandra Overend was selected on the basis of family connections or because she is a woman. She will probably join Jo-Anne Dobson  from Upper Bann, to whom she presented the UUP Woman of the Year Award early in 2010,  as one of two female candidates on the Party ticket for the 2011 Assembly elections. Jo-Anne was second, undoubtedly by merit, in a field of six seeking selection in Upper Bann.

Tom Elliott has a considerable challenge to present a credible Assembly candidate team, with a credible policy agenda (not being the DUP is TUV territory now) and a sense that the Ulster Unionist Party is worth voting for.  Many blame poor public relations or lack of media sense, or lack of Party discipline as the reason for the UUP failure to connect with the electorate. Perhaps. More likely it has been a central vacuum in leadership and organisation, an absense of firm sense of purpose and apalling people management that is hampering the Party from moving out of the doldrums and onto improved electoral success.  If there is a selection process which is endeavouring to politically engineer success (women √, youth √ loyal to leader√ etc √) it will inevitably fail where it lacks a direction as to what the Party is trying to build; focusing on the Party rather than the electorate or driven by personality rather than political sense.

The greatest challenge for the UUP (shared by all unionist Parties) is moving out of ‘peace process’ narrative that is deeply resented and mistrusted by the broad unionist electorate and to abandon any hint of ‘constructive ambiguity’ which is viewed as corrupting.  Tom Elliott needs to be both liberal in the ‘live and live’ sense while having the strength of being honest and direct to the electorate (and political opponents) even if at times that could be challenged as ‘hardline’.

Given the strength of the Fermanagh organisation the Ulster Unionist Party membership may believe that Tom Elliott is the man to bring all the pieces together, in every sense, and to define a purposeful UUP with a distinct and positive outlook on moving Northern Ireland forward. This is essential to his most urgent task to reverse the UUP’s electoral flat-lining.

Basil lost the UUP leadership election. Tom Elliott has a great deal of work to do to prove that the 70% of the evening’s Party voters made the right choice, and he only has six months in which to at least start to make a difference.  There is no doubt that Basil McCrea is ready and willing to be first to resume the challenge should Tom fail to make that start.

The post Why did Basil lose? appeared first on thedissenter.

The posturing, positioning and indignant defiance over impending reduction in government expenditure is rife. But it is not just David Cameron who thinks Northern Ireland has a command economy that matches anything once boasted by the Soviet bloc.

In the rent-seeking economy of Northern Ireland, it is deemed politic to blame others for the withdrawal of funding across the economy.  It is also an indictment of both the poverty of aspiration and lack of imagination among the political class.

Much of  Northern Ireland government spending is decided in Whitehall, for example social security spend, or Europe, the bulk of DARD’s money pot. Much of the discussion will be placed on efficiency of Departmental administration of those funds.  The range and scope of much of health expenditure is also directed from Whitehall, though there is a great deal of scope to review how that money is managed and spent.  Similarly, education could be reviewed in the context of building and deepening academic excellence at all levels rather than political polemic. More importantly, as the political class seems increasing remote for the electorate, perhaps it is time to think how government could be devolved back to the individual. Northern Ireland government requires a total rethink.

The thinking has to start somewhere. thedissenter asked Eamonn Butler, Director of the Adam Smith Institute for some basic pointers our politicians might take on board when considering ‘cuts’ in a wider dimension. Five questions in almost as many minutes. Eamonn is keynote speaker at the Agenda NI seminar Rethinking Government on 26th October at the Grosvenor House Conference Centre, Belfast. It will be interesting to hear how the politicians, social sector and business community respond to his thinking.

It is not time to cut government in Northern Ireland: it is time to take the opportunity to reinvent government in Northern Ireland.

Eamonn Bulter is Director and co-founder of Britain’s leading free-market policy think tank, the Adam Smith Institute, and a leading author and broadcaster on economics and social issues. Westminster insiders look forward each week to his wry online commentary on politics and politicians.

Eamonn is author of books on a wide range of subjects, from economics through psychology to politics. These include easy-read introductions to the economists Milton Friedman, F A Hayek and Adam Smith, and a short explanation of how markets work, called (modestly) The Best Book on the Market, which he wrote to be “so simple that even politicians can understand it.”

The ADAM SMITH INSTITUTE is one of the world’s leading think tanks. Through its research, education programmes and media appearances, it promotes free markets, limited government, and an open society. It also has a regular blog.

Today, these timeless ideas are more important than ever. Government spending is near 50 percent of GDP, the budget deficit has reached historic levels, and the state intrudes into almost every area of our lives. Businesses are tied up in red tape, and families struggle under a growing tax burden.

The Adam Smith Institute does not aim to think about policy for its own sake, but to change events. It works with politicians from all sides, and engineers policies which are not just economically sound, but calibrated to be politically deliverable too.

The Institute has an enviable record of success. Throughout its history, it has been at the forefront of moves to reduce taxes, inject choice and competition into public services, and create a more free and prosperous society.

But the Institute’s work is about more than simply affecting policy; it also aims to educate young people. With its easy-to-read beginners’ guides, its student conferences and seminars, and its school and university visits, the Institute aims to reach and inspire the next generation.

The News Letter Union 2021 Series of articles through the summer has been an interesting read.  It also provides thedissenter a useful way to address the second part of post-election review: Part 1 having looked at relative electoral strengths, historical and current.

Having looked at the News Letter’s list of questions thedissenter has reversed the order to start with consideration of what challenges 2011 might hold for Unionists. There is every indication that Sinn Fein is gearing up for another crisis and more talks within the next twelve months – chip, chip, chip. The big question is then ‘how prepared is Unionism for the road ahead to 2021 and beyond?’, including the challenge of starting to prepare for that journey now.

This is a slightly longer version than appears in the News Letter, free from the paper’s 600 word limit.

Moving Forward Part 2

It is not about whether or not a Sinn Fein First Minster is acceptable. The current political structures, into which both the DUP and UUP have bought, mean that this is a possibility though far from a certainty.

In his recent News Letter article Alex Kane rightly outlines the challenge for Unionists should Sinn Fein be the largest party at the next election.  While electoral pacts have been discussed widely, alternative strategies have been absent in public discussion.

There is a widespread acceptance that we have a great deal less than good Government at Stormont.  Following on from Hillsborough, we are still waiting for Ritchie and Empey to get back to the Executive on improving process to make Government work. It is most likely that the failure is fundamentally within the structures.  In which case, likely solutions are only possible with a complete rethink.

Stoic acceptance of the institutions as they are is down to a failure of Unionism at the outset to have had a clear agenda for Government – devolution seems to have been an end in itself. If neither main Unionist Party leader is willing to serve as Deputy First Minister then are they prepared to bring the house down?

Being ‘prepared’ would mean having an alternative pathway, and working hard on preparing the ground for such a scenario.  Regardless of this scenario playing out in the event of Sinn Fein being the largest party, the growing logjam and catalogue of failure to deliver, may mean a time-out is demanded from the public. Hillsborough showed how hopelessly unprepared Unionism is in planning for the future, too willing to deal with the minutiae (badly) and seemingly unable to challenge a tired and empty Republican narrative – St Andrews before, Belfast before that, and before then….

All very well, but what would that prepared pathway be? A plan for Government by voluntary coalition that would provide accountability, stability and mature democratic checks and balances?  Fewer Executive Departments for sure, and far fewer than 26 local Councils: unnecessary for a small geographic area of under 2 million people – 3 Councils perhaps, or none at all?

At a bigger level what would that Government be about?  The recent Centre for Social Justice Report, Breakthrough Northern Ireland,  has shown the challenge in rebuilding society – all the billions of EU Peace funding shows that money is not the solution.  Are our areas of deprivation worse than the worst in Manchester, Liverpool or even parts of London? Are we that special? Troubles aside, economic and social breakdown is a story familiar too elsewhere in the UK with identical themes.

The corollary of social breakdown is even greater challenge in respect of education, where the selection debate has overshadowed the failings at primary level. If there is social reform, there must also be economic reform.

The time for the end of the Invest NI life-support machine is coming – the business sector is as much grounded in a dependency culture as the social sector. Nationalists cannot complain about a significant reduction in Northern Ireland’s public sector. If there is to be an all-Islands economy (one of the largest in the world of which we are already an integrated part) then the public sector engagement in the economy has to be reduced to the UK level (even at its current high of 50%) . Perhaps we should aim to be close to Irish Republic’s smaller public sector, otherwise a reduction in corporation tax is pointless and should not even be under consideration.

Those who are creating wealth in society must be encouraged at the expense of those who profit from public subsidy. Far from NI Water returning to the Department of Regional Development it must be prepared for the private sector.

It is not necessary for Unionist parties to unite structurally to agree common points on a future for good government.  The Unionist electorate is not a single monolithic body. It does not lack choice in Party, rather in leadership and ideas on moving forward. No matter the number of parties, Unionism is currently failed by a lack of strategic and purposeful leadership.  There would be a collective electorate groan at the thought of the present Unionist leaderships entering more talks on the future of Northern Ireland given their abject failure to date.

What is required to 2021 and beyond is coherent vision and a policy driven agenda that sets out what is necessary for a small, open, free and intelligence-led economy making a positive social, cultural and political contribution within the UK. This, far far more than (and probably in spite of) political manoeuvering or structural machinations, will build and strengthen the Union.

The News Letter’s Union 2021 Series asks 5 questions from contributors:

1. What do you think Northern Ireland’s Union with Great Britain will look like in 2021?
2.  What would you like it to look like?
3. Is unionist unity essential for the achievement of your vision?
4. If so, what does that mean?
5. Could you accept a Sinn Fein first minister?

There is no doubt that the Parades Commission has become an impediment to dialogue by acting in an arbitrary and inconsistent manner.  This may because the Commission is caught between it’s regulatory responsibilities, its inability to understand that it has no ‘public order’ role, and the tendency to accept advice or comment coming directly from politicians (or the NIO) as being of greater importance than the facts before them in a particular and local case.

It often seems that the last issue to be considered by the Parades Commission is the particular parade under consideration.

Of course the Parades Commission is operating in a context that is highly politicised; though it is meant to be outside ‘political considerations, that idea was dashed when a parade on the Ormeau Road was denied in deference to the ‘Peace Process’ – which looked like not placing responsibility on republicans not to riot. The ‘political process’ has been elevated to over-write all other considerations and the consequent political interference or indifference with respect to parades has been to the detriment of the Rule of Law. No better example of that is the absolute breakdown in authority evident in violence across Northern Ireland in the week of the 12^th July 2010.  Politics and police just stood there taking the abuse and with little evidence of a longer-term response.

While parading by the Orange Order may have provided a context at the 12th, there was little evidence that the July rioters cared deeply whether the Orange Order paraded or not.  The principal battle for hearts and minds is being played out in the Republican/nationalist communities – violence in Lurgan and Londonderry, and elsewhere, was pure thuggery to demonstrate that Sinn Fein’s support for the devolution of policing means little on the streets. The new Republicans on the block have learned well from those who similarly brought anger to the streets in the past: a progression from one generation to the next.

Meanwhile a review of legislation on parades and protest is on-going. The OFMDFM consultation is now the seventh review of the Parades Commission since its inception.

From the outset the Parades Commission was an unparalleled and unwarranted interference with the peaceful expression of a people’s culture and had significant potential to undermine of the Rule of Law. There is no moral or human rights justification for political and legal interference with cultural expression: quite the contrary.  Trade Unionists claim the limitation within the OFMDFM paper are unique in Europe forget that they failed to raise a voice on the Parades Legislation which was similarly unique and intolerant.

Since the inception of the Parades Commission there has been a clear admission by Republicanism of a planned process to use the issue of parades for political advantage.

Sinn Fein has made no secret of its political activity in raising the parades issue.  In the event the political process has been used as a sledgehammer to demonise, diminish and disrupt the exercise of legal, peaceful and fundamental freedom of cultural expression.  The policy has been one of creating a cultural apartheid where no Protestant is seen, heard, or permitted within a stones throw of a designated, reserved, “sanitised” nationalist space:

There were a number of distinct advantages for Republicans in moving forward on the parades agenda. First it plays to the gallery and maintains a wedge between communities. In the absence of armed conflict it maintains a war of words that retains simmering sectarian tensions on which republicanism relies for purpose. This was a political hammer being used to crack a cultural nut. While leaders of the Orange Order may from time to time make pronouncements on broad political matters, it does not function as a political organisation. It was always poorly suited to a public political argument and certainly not to understand or challenge a political machine.

 

Political interference has prolonged the parades issue in Northern Ireland.  The Parades Commission was itself a buck-passing exercise by the NIO, supported by the police – a firewall to take the heat off the Secretary of State and Chief Constable.  It was born of political strategy and suckled by the political expediency of politicians who wanted to be seen as leading the fight (both sides), and by the demands of the ‘political process’ that meant not confronting the realities of rights and responsibilities as they should be within a society where the Rule of Law is paramount.

How the placing of the Parades issue into the Office of OFMDFM will not result in political interference/dealing/brokering is outside thedissenter’s ability to imagine.  The present proposals seem to have been predicated on a political deal at Hillsborough.  That the issue of Parades is being discussed in the context of a political deal is itself a weakness and indicative of a fundamental flaw in strategic thinking.  A principled and fair outcome to the resolution of parades issues should be a local matter, having due respect for the Rule of Law, and not reliant on externalities.  If the Review itself depends on a political deal, then how will parades not continue to be politicised and used to modulate tensions and division to the benefit of a few and to the detriment of all?

The process outlined by this most recent consultation process merely transfers the Parades Commission from being a quasi-judicial ‘independent’ body within the orbit of the NIO, to a quasi-judicial office within the orbit of the OFMDFM.  This does not inspire confidence in transparency, accountability or an end to political interference.    A previous ‘Quigley Report’ on parades had positive ideas with respect to an open, accountable and transparent process of addressing parading issues.  There were elements of the mediation aspects of that Report which were woolly, but if offered a strategic view rather than political fix.

The current proposals do not offer significant encouragement to believe that a Shared Future is possible while a process exists in law that can be used to politically delineate and define ‘our streets’, and ‘our territory’. That this process is given legal standing does not remove legislation on parades and protest from the status of base sectarian harassment of folks wishing to be free to express their culture or viewpoints in peace and without fear of threat or violence.

In a normal society, one in which cultural pluralism is the norm and freedom of conscience is cherished, where another’s culture and views are respected, there would be no need for parades regulation by whatever name that body is known.  The Ashdown Interim Consultation Report assumed the premise of a ‘normal’ society.  If OFMDFM believed that Northern Ireland society has the ability to move forward then why consider the regulation of a people’s culture to be at all necessary?  How does legislation that tends towards cultural apartheid and unreasonably and unfairly penalises a particular culture.

The Rule of Law should be sufficient to protect freedoms without regulatory bodies open to political interference. But authority, and the leadership that falls from that place of respect and standing in either politics or policing, seems absent. That we are where we are on parades and protests shows an attitude that all too readily accepts intolerance and exclusion as a norm, and for some is a political necessity.

What has changed?

The 2010 Westminster election is over.  While the poll outcome was inconclusive the upshot is a decisive shift in British Politics where a progressive coalition has burst through the liberal centre/right. In the process, there were no important phone calls to the Northern Ireland parties, who now sit on the Parliamentary margins.

The debates on national television provided an energy to the national election. Locally the election campaign was as lacklustre and uninspiring as the Party leaders on the local TV debates.

On the nationalist side the new leader of the SDLP simply argued a greener case than Sinn Fein, ceding any advantage new leadership might offer in setting the electoral debate and regaining ground in the future. Sinn Fein organised a campaign that seemed more a prelude to the 2011 Assembly elections and must be disappointed that they made little inroad into the SDLP vote on polling day.

The obvious decline in SDLP votes since 1998 is not to the great benefit of Sinn Fein.  For Westminster 2001, the high point of nationalist turnout, the SDLP had 168,873 and Sinn Fein 175,932; in 2010, 110,970 and 171,942 respectively.  In percentage terms Sinn Fein is clearly outvoting the SDLP, but it has made no gains in number of votes.  The overall Nationalist/Republican vote appears relatively static.

Republicans, in particular, have made much of an inroad into defeating Unionism, electorally. While Unionism was once dominant electorally, this was at a time when nationalists probably failed to even register to vote. The heady early 1970s, when unionist voters turned out in great numbers, was not a time of unionist unity. Since then, nationalists and republicans have fully engaged in the electoral process, and around 200,000 have been added to the electoral register.

Summarily, the increase in registered voters has been to the benefit of neither nationalists nor unionists. In recent years the electorate, unionist and nationalist, has slowly disengaged from politics. However, ignoring the numbers and entering the percentage game, Sinn Fein has gained as it holds its vote relative to others.  Somehow, despite Sinn Fein’s project seemingly stalling, Unionist Parties are presenting a picture of unionism in crisis.

Much has been made of the apparent failure of leaders (and leadership) within Unionism, and there has been a great deal of debate since the Westminster election on the topic of what the future holds for unionism.

The numbers suggest that the Ulster Unionist Party is bumping along and has done little to regain the electoral trust that it squandered under David Trimble. Just as the UUP climbed electoral heights in the 1990s, so it has fallen to consistent lows over the past decade.  The decline has been hard for a Party that still gives the impression that it still believes itself to the natural Party of Government. Although the UUP electoral arrangement with the Conservative Party has been derided, on the positive side, at least the Party could had the finance to run a campaign and the vote was probably no worse than if the arrangement hadn’t existed.

A lowly UUP ought to have been good news for the DUP. However, similar to their principal partners in the Northern Ireland Executive, the DUP has not been able to take advantage of their rival’s electoral slide. The DUP vote has been remarkably stable over the past decade.  The Party immediately benefited from the mistrust of the Ulster Unionist Party; acting as the standard bearer of opposition to sharing power with Sinn Fein. In the decade from 1998, those who became disillusioned or discontented with the UUP either left politics or joined the DUP.  Over this period the unionist electorate could be characterised as either being ‘for’ the UUP or ‘against’.

In the 2007 Assembly election there was still a broad expectation that the DUP would not enter Government with Sinn Fein. When they did, off the back of apparently verified decommissioning by the IRA (which seems to have missed 40% ), it can be no surprise that the DUP would suffer to some extent in the same way as the UUP.  That was certainly the instance in the 2009 European Election, when Jim Allister of the TUV took a signification proportion of the unionist vote.

While the TUV did less well in the Westminster election, drift from the two main parties was nevertheless marked. Trust has gone. Yes, there was an agreed unionist candidate in Fermanagh South Tyrone, and the DUP stood aside in North Down. Even so, in an election when the overall unionist vote increased on the 2007 Assembly election, the DUP must be disappointed that it cannot point to any positive electoral gain.

Nationalism performed less well than unionism in the Westminster election, albeit marginally. Yet the debate post election is on the future of unionism. Inevitably this has centred on the future of the Parties, and in particular the leaderships.

No unionist leader has much to cheer about post-election.  The TUV performed poorly, though it was never likely that the European pr vote could have been replicated in the first-past-the-post Westminster poll. Still, the TUV lacked depth in its candidate selection, and Jim Allister’s political persona was one of anger.  The Unionist electorate is past anger. It wants to trust again. To do that it desires confidence in a leadership can attract talent and articulate a pathway to restoring community, cultural and political confidence. The TUV was not alone in failing to meet that expectation.

Sir Reg Empey lost in South Antrim. Perhaps he has done enough service to David Cameron’s Conservatives to gain a peerage and join David Trimble, in which case his candidature was not entirely in vain.  It was his close association with David Trimble that probably reduced his chances in South Antrim, where not even a hawkish David Burnside had been able to hold the seat. The electorate that punished the UUP then, and sent an unambiguous message on the leadership of David Trimble, was hardly likely to vote now for someone equally at the heart of the Good Friday Agreement.  Adrian Watson, the choice of the local UUP would probably have fared better as a new and local face for Westminster.

Sir Reg also lost on the wider political field. From the outset of the UUP Conservative arrangement he failed to present a convincing narrative to overcome the sense that this was a marriage of convenience: the Conservatives needed a significant electoral base in Northern Ireland and the UUP needed the money.  The UUP message that Stormont was a ‘huckster’s shop’ should have had some traction with a disillusioned electorate. However, Sir Reg’s inability to bring clarity and direction to the UCUNF (UUP/Conservative) arrangement suggested that he equally unable to manage his own neighbourhood store. There was the sluggishness in agreeing candidates. Finally, for thedissenter, Fred Cobain standing as a Conservative & Unionist?

And yet, the UUP vote broadly held up across Northern Ireland. Yes, it now has no seats at Westminster.  But it still has a base on which to build. On the wider national electoral front the politics of the nation has been trust into new territory with the Conservative/Liberal coalition (or is that Liberal Conservative coalition).  There is deep resentment of the central Conservative Party organisation among many local Conservative constituency organisations.  Although talking about decentralising power from Westminster, Cameron has strongly centralised Conservative Party organisation around his own team.  This has not delivered the majority he needed; in many instances this was down to lack of flexibility in addressing local electoral campaigns: Adrian Watson is a case in point.

What became clear on election night was that the country no longer acts uniformly. The great swingometer was made redundant on a night where local electorates seemed to take a local view – resulting in massively varying swings across the country.  It would suggest that future candidates will need to emphasise more local issues and rely less on national coat-tails.

In this respect there is certainly a place for more regionally based politically associations where the central party outlines core principles, but does not dictate local candidate selection and tolerates a degree of policy variance around the country.  If the Conservatives and the UUP can find that balance between regional and national interests then there is a future for the UUP. Otherwise, not.

At times in the run-up to and during the election the argument of the UUP almost seemed to be that the DUP couldn’t be trusted: to which the electorate added the word ‘either’. In the end the only place that this mattered was in East Belfast, where the electorate cast a plague on the UUP and DUP. Of course the rejection of a sitting MP, and in this case the leader of the DUP, was a huge slap to Peter Robinson.  In the rest of the country the DUP held its own and it seats.

The East Belfast seat was not a natural loss, had there been anyone of stature in the East Belfast DUP to have stood as an alternative to Peter Robinson: Strangford, the Westminster seat once held by Iris Robinson was retained by the DUP. The electoral strategy for the East Belfast seat has long been the strength of the Robinsons (Westminster/Assembly/Council) to bring in all others on their coat-tails.  Time for a re-think.

The apparent nature of the internal politics of the DUP suggests that there is little likelihood of Robinson being replaced as leader; for reasons not that dissimilar to the earlier thedissenter piece in the wake of revelations around Iris Robinson earlier in the year. The early DUP was shaped by Ian Paisley. The latter-day DUP has been shaped by Peter Robinson.  There is little obvious alternative to Peter Robinson’s leadership.  Peter Robinson’s East Belfast Assembly seat is relatively secure, as one of many, which assures his leadership position where it matters most to the DUP, at Stormont.

Before bringing together all these points into a broad conclusion it is worth noting the success of Naomi Long. First, by accepting David Ford at the Executive Table, the Alliance Party has been elevated to the position of central and ‘trusted’ player.  Second Naomi Long is local, and hard working. Third, Alliance has always had strength in East Belfast. Finally, she wasn’t Peter Robinson, and whether unionist or not, she isn’t perceived as nationalist.

The Alliance Party has been much stronger in the 1970s, 1980s and even the 1990s than it has been anytime in the past decade.  It still has a lot of work to do to grow its base, and there are not obviously an army of Long-type candidates to make an impact in 2011 at Stormont (and probably across 26 Local Government areas). In percentage terms it’s vote will look good where any general increase is a gain against an smaller voting public overall, though in pure numbers terms it has a long way to go.  Notions of some kind of renaissance in the political centre ground are premature.

Back to the big debate, within and around Unionism. The focus of that debate is numbers, and focused on whether in the forthcoming 2011 election Sinn Fein might gain a position where it may be able to lay claim to the post of First Minister.

Since the changes following the St Andrews Agreement any party with the votes and seats necessary can lay claim to the post of First Minister.  This provides for more equitable power-sharing in that it does not create a hierarchy of parties – theoretically anyone can be a First Minister. Would it make a great difference for Sinn Fein to be First Minister? If you accept Sinn Fein as a partner in Government then why not?

The most recent political push for unionist unity has arisen principally as a DUP campaign tactic to corner the UUP/Conservative arrangement, pushing at the fact that one of the certainties espoused in this arrangement was that the Conservatives were committed to stand in all 18 seats.  The agreement of a candidate on a unity-style ticket in Fermanagh South Tyrone undermined the determination of the UUP/Conservative pact. Had Rodney Connor won it would have placed even greater pressure on the UUP/Conservative pact that it failed to make a similar arrangement in South Belfast.

That the tactic in Fermanagh South Tyrone failed to deliver its intended outcome still leaves the DUP in a position to argue that it only failed because it was late in the day, the electorate was unconvinced of UUP sincerity, the Conservative link lost vital votes and anything that throws blame around and away to the DUP: this is a criticism of the DUP blame game generally and not that, conversely, the DUP is ‘to blame’.

The focus on the issue of First Minister is a tactical one – a means to give purpose to closer co-operation between the parties (if not merger). Yet the real issue is not one of tactics to meet short-term and tokenistic outcomes. The failure of Sir Reg (lost seat, lost leadership) to stabilise and provide purpose to the UUP, the DUP’s failure to dismiss the TUV altogether and to regain momentum lost in 2009, reflect deeper malaise within unionist parties.

Ironically, the arrival of the TUV brought unionist voters to the polling booths and increased the overall unionist vote would suggest that disunity has its advantages, allowing the fractious and independently minded unionist voter an avenue to express discontent with established parties.

The logic of engagement by all parties in the institutions of the Good Friday Agreement is an acceptance that the Union is safe in the hands of the unionist electorate: that is the principle of consent.  Unionist voters accept this and many seem content not to vote for parties that fail to reflect their concerns and provide competent government.   This is not a problem for unionism alone, nationalism has a similar challenge, though seems content to lose itself in the green romantic mists of a united Ireland at the end of the rainbow.  A plague on all their houses?

Addressing unionist unity from a structural perspective is bound to disappoint. Political party realignment is merely mixing decks and dishing out the job cards in a different order.  The electorate is hardly likely to be impressed. Identifying a loss of voter, by class or aspiration, does not address the message sent at the Westminster election: none of the leaders of unionism presented a coherent and inspirational purpose for unionism in the twenty-first century.

A unionist should feel proud to fly the Union flag, and should not feel that it is somewhat diminished when wrapped around those who seek to lead Unionism. It should not be worn in anger, it should not cover embarrassment, and it should not be wrapped around a backroom deal.  Discussion on the Union should be a matter of substance, not tactical number crunching: it is a matter for open discussion, not whispers behind closed doors.

Unionist Parties may be under threat through a loss of relative electoral strength. That does not mean that the Union is under threat: which is not to say that the Union cannot be lost. As elsewhere, this article has been an exercise in looking at the outcomes of the Westminster election and reading the runes. There are a few pointers which may shape consideration of the future for Unionists.

• The overall nationalist vote appears static.
• Nationalist voters appear just as disengaged as unionist voters.
• The UUP might consider its future within a regional/national and liberal conservative context, but is otherwise nothing but a fading reflection of better times.
• The DUP built its presence on becoming biggest: now it is, what next?
• The unionist voter seemed uninspired by any of the unionist Parties’ offers.
• The overall unionist vote benefits from disunity, not unity.
• The SDLP was dominant in 1998. What happened?
• If Sinn Fein is a worthy party for Government, and to hold a post co-equal to the First Minister then why shouldn’t it hold the post of First Minister?
• The issue of a Sinn Fein First Minister is a narrow tactical argument that distracts from the lack of attractive leadership from either the UUP or DUP, or from anywhere elsewhere in unionist circles.
• Short-term tactical considerations will not address the future of unionism as a political cause.
• The Union is safe: at least that rests with the electorate and not the politicians.

The Westminster election changed very little. The points above have been matters for varying degree of consideration for some time. The election has simply brought them to the fore. Much of that discussion has taken place at Open Unionism and in the pages of the press, and probably around the lunch tables of Stormont buildings and meeting places elsewhere.

Tactical considerations of stopping a Sinn Fein First Minister are given an air of immediacy, including an urgency on discussion of political party restructuring. The larger and more important issue of the purpose and sense of Unionist cause is receiving less attention, perhaps because there is no personal or party gain in thinking outside the box?  (It is a lonely place outside the box, and risky.)  How does the discussion move beyond the tactical and party political to a more central discussion on the nature and future expression of Unionism fit for the twenty-first century?

Without a common understanding of the central tenets of Unionism there is little chance of Party political unity among unionists. Unionists must know what the Union is for, holding common purpose; it must not be defined by what it is not, what it is against. The electorate wishes positive, not negative, Unionism. With that central understanding would party political unionism mean anything anyway? Is unionism an ‘ism’ at all? How do we move beyond a position of being in defence of the Union to advancing and deepening the Union? These are the questions to be the subject of Looking Forward: Part 2. Later.

*/** please note that the graphs are indicative. While every effort was made to input the numbers correctly, sometimes interpretation of orginal data was difficult. I may have designated an independent in the unionist circles when it should have been nationalist: the early 1970s was a confusing time. ’Others’ sometimes includes all but the main parties; more than just the odds and sods. Data on registered electorate and turnout was not always available, and sometimes only in percentage terms. Taking all this into account,  all graphs should be viewed as broadly accurate, but mostly illustrative.  If any reader wishes to repeat the exercise and find fault, the source information is found within CAIN and ARK: knock yourself out.

Perhaps thedissenter should have commented in the run up to, and during, the election in Northern Ireland. But the build up to, and conduct of, the local campaigns was not exactly exciting; business beckoned, a bit of travel to be done, and it was time for a break.

So in retrospect and to bring thedissenter up to date…

Campaigning for the Westminster election in Northern Ireland had an air of reluctance, or nervousness; perhaps born out of uncertainty as to how the election would impact on the local Parties. Politics in Northern Ireland seems to have descended into a tactical contest, where any greater purpose to gaining power has been lost in the pursuit of power itself (or clinging on to the certainty of what is already held). The Westminster campaigns in Northern Ireland seemed more of a prelude to the 2011 Assembly elections than one of national consequence.

The SDLP had a new leader trying to hold its vote and not lose ground to Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein ran the same old faces, and hoped to gain ground on the SDLP.  Both nationalist parties begged the same votes for the same romantic notion of a united Ireland at the end of the rainbow when all would be well and good – earlier, Brian Cowan had set out the real politic and focusing on bigger issues on St Patrick’s Day.  Other than for tactical considersations of the least worst option, neither nationalist Party appealed to the electorate that matters to their ultimate aspiration (again, see Brian Cowan’s words).

Peter Robinson gave himself a bad press on the eve of the election, which didn’t seem to impact on the Party as a whole. The UUP/Conservative grouping gave the appearance of being as disorganised as the huckster’s shop in which it continues to hold two Executive seats. The newcomers, the Traditional Unionist Voice, were the great unknown factor and a first-past-the-post Westminster election was the worst outing a fledgling party could face.

The Alliance Party and Naomi Long? Bless.

The 2009 European election showed, at least on the Unionist side, that the electorate no longer swallowed the warnings of the doomsayers, nor feared the Sinn Fein bogeymen on which many election strategies were based. A large proportion voted and damn the consequences.  For 2010 Westminster the unionist electorate was largely more circumspect, but hardly enthusiastic: evidenced in Fermanagh South Tyrone. Unionism is past anger; frustrated and petulant, but not angry. The simple interpretion on the electoral fortunes of the three unionist Party leaders is: ‘ a plague on all your houses’.

Unionism is in flux, and May 6th has not provided any clarity on the questions that should be asked let alone provide any answers. That debate will continue and is to be welcomed.

Northern Ireland’s 18 Westminster seats were always going to be filled, even if choice in voting preference was diminished by the available options being well and truly woeful.  In general, commentary and analysis on the election results has been mostly inward rather than outward. The now marginal status of all local parties at Westminster may tend to exacerbate that focus. Yet change is always a time of opportunuity. The new consensus in Government at Westminster, for as long as it can last, offers such opportunity if grasped.

If this post seems to ramble a little it is because thedissenter is in a process of thinking, reassessing fundamentals, throwing the bricks in the air and rebuilding ideas. That may take some time. Absence has not brought any conclusions. In the meantime regular commentary will resume once the electoral dust has settled.

All the ingredients were there: the crisis, the Prime Ministers, the big house, the Belfast Telegraph survey, the Parties doing all night sittings and the press pack.  At the end of all that we have the “Agreement at Hillsborough Castle” as it is officially described.  Not a deal.  Not “The Hillsborough Castle Agreement”.  Nothing definitive, just ‘agreement’ as part of a step process: same process as the “Agreement at St Andrews‘.

Many are of course delighted that there was any sort of agreement at all.  Especially Gordon Brown who would undoubtedly not wish one of New Labour’s great projects to crash just before a Westminster election, and probably David Cameron who will not inherit an immediate crisis should he become Prime Minister after the General Election.

The ‘Agreement at Hillsborough’ amounts to very little but a process that revolves around progress towards the devolution of Policing & Justice.  The only certainty is that there is a date assigned for the transfer of Policing and Justice to the Northern Ireland Assembly. That date appears to be conditional on a range of other points/matters/actions happening in some sort of sequence.

What are the chances of the agreement working out to a conclusion?  The Agreement is in five parts.

Section One provides a date for the devolution of Policing and Justice to the Northern Ireland Assembly.  There are a series of procedural steps which, so long as Gordon Brown does not call an election in the next few weeks should see the formal transfer of powers by 12 April.

Section Two is Parades. It is hard to see how Sinn Fein will ever accept that people lawfully and peacefully should not be subject to the sectarian harassment of unlawful violent protest, or a planned protest which lacks the discipline to behave in a civilised manner. The pursuit of cultural apartheid through designation of Protestant-free zones seems to underline republican demonisation of the Loyal Orders. Hard to see how Republicans will ever agree to a shared future when they are unable to countenance sharing a stretch of road a few times a year; not that many in the SDLP are more tolerant.

Section Three is a clever device to sideline the UUP and SDLP.  The problems with the functionality of the Executive lie in the institutional arrangements; the Executive seeks to enforce consensus among a disparate group of political parties which, leaving aside their constitutional pre-dispositions, have little in common. Section Three is not likely to amount to much more than the generation of a whinge list, but is disconnected to the issue of the devolution of Policing and Justice, and therefore is of little immediate consequence.

Section Four outlines no more than just an administrative catch-up process.  As with Section Three this is not timetabled and therefore may well be forgotten about unless there is a need to show something of progress – even if it is only seeing the Executive finally get round to doing what it ought to have already done, which if they were able to agree they would have done already.

Section Five is timetabled, and suggests that the Junior Ministers will be exceptionally busy. Not only are they putting a progress and action plan together for outstanding Executive business (Section Four), they will also be doing a report on outstanding issues from the St Andrews Agreement.  The most recent Policing and Justice ‘crisis’ has arisen from a very different determination what is meant by in paragraph 7 of the Agreement at St Andrews : “It is our view that implementation of the agreement published today should be sufficient to build the community confidence necessary for the Assembly to request the devolution of criminal justice and policing from the British Government by May 2008.” If there is failure to even agree on what was agreed then, what presently constitutes an ‘outstanding matter’ may well be a challenge in itself.

The fanfare for this ‘agreement’ is worthy of a snake oil salesmen’s convention. Agreed, tentatively and with provisos, is a date for the devolution of Policing and Justice.  That is it. The DUP has allowed the issue of ‘community confidence’ to focus on the parades issue, but that is just one area where confidence in the Stormont administration is weak.  Lack of accountability, the chimera of collective responsibility and absent democratic counterbalance of effective opposition are fundamentals that appear not to have been discussed at Hillsborough, yet are underlying factors in the lack of unionist confidence in Stormont generally.

Sectioning parades hides the real fear of devolution of Policing and Justice with respect to that issue: Section One (9), that a future Minister could take a decision by request or otherwise, to step in to ban a parade without recourse to the Executive. Given the history of the generation of parades contention by Sinn Fein, the pattern is set.  With the Justice Minister open to d’Hondt in the next Assembly the ground is set for a heightening of conflict centred on parades, whoever gets the Justice Ministry.

The quasi-judicial powers of the Justice Minister is the ticking time-bomb on parades. More immediately, the parades fuse is lit on this ‘Agreement’. Ashdown wasn’t even close to a credible alternative to the Parades Commission. Serious questions on the process within that ‘interim’ report remain unanswered; yet that ‘report’ is noted as a start point on which to build.

The Hillsborough talks have demonstrated that the DUP is as useless as the UUP at negotiation: the lead-up to Hillsborough was promising, but the end result is a big disappointment.  The DUP blinked, and Sinn Fein is now piling on the pressure on parades, upping the ante and making resolution on parades nigh on impossible: the most recent outburst from Martin McGuinness is an example.  More generally, the remarks by Pat Doherty point to a longer term process of attrition; building on the undermining of cultural identity and political confidence within the broad unionist electorate.

Sinn Fein has its date for devolution of Policing and Justice.  Once in process, how many believe there will be much concluded of Sections Two, Three, Four and Five without another ‘crisis’.

By any measure, unionist community confidence in the ‘Agreement at Hillsborough’ is at best low.  The text of the published document was printed in newspapers and is readily available online as a document and subject of comment. The success of the snake oil salesman is in the ignorance and credulity of the buying public.  To presume that somehow the lack of confidence can be solved by wider publication is erroneous.

Parades may be an obvious point of contention in this ‘Agreement’, but fundamentally the real issue is a lack of confidence in the institutions themselves into which Policing and Justice is to be devolved.  Broadly speaking, the unionist community has little desire for more snake oil from the huckster’s store, no matter how many times the bottle is rebranded ‘new & improved’.